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1. Introduction
1.1. Purpose
The purpose of this Software Design Document (SDD) is to provide the design for the
elements that need to be implemented to create the back end of the vVote election system
for the Victorian Electoral Commission (VEC). The vVote election system is an end-to-
end voter-verifiable election system based on the Preˆt a` Voter system. This document,
in addition to providing the design for those elements requiring implementation, will also
give some brief background into the properties that the vVote system aims to provide and
how they relate to the end-to-end voter-verifiable properties defined in current academic
literature.
Since electoral procedures di↵er considerably from one jurisdiction to another, this
design document relates specifically to VEC elections, and would need appropriate adap-
tations for other environments. However, the overall structure of the system is entirely
suitable for other elections, and particularly Australian elections, and the vVote elec-
tion system has been designed in such a way that it could be enhanced to cover other
jurisdictions without extensive replumbing. The enhancements would primarily deal
with procedural variations (for instance, elections where voters can specify a ranking of
parties) and modifications to provide better scalability for jurisdictions with di↵erent
typical voting behaviour or larger numbers of candidates.
1.2. Scope
The SDD describes, in detail, those components that require implementation to com-
plete the vVote system. There are additional external components that either have
already been implemented or are currently being implemented. This document will not
provide details of those designs but will refer to them and outline their properties and
functionality. Where there is a direct interface between the components designed in this
document and an external component the interface will be detailed within this SDD.
The overall scope of the components in this SDD concerns the back-end infrastructure
for the vVote system. The front-end components are being designed and implemented
separately; however, we will specify the format and nature of the interfaces between the
front end and the back end in this SDD.
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1.3. Context
The guiding principle behind the design is that the election system should be publicly
verifiable: individual voters should be able to check that their votes have not been
tampered with, and anyone should be able to verify the final election tally. Every step
of the process should be verifiable, and should not require trust in any individual person
or machine.
The system will provide mathematical proofs of all its sensitive operations. Verification
of these proofs is something that members of the public should be able to perform using
their own machines and, if desired, their own software. This means that voters will
not need to trust electoral o cials, software developers or hardware components to act
correctly, because the integrity of the election will be verifiable at a mathematical level.
Part of this commitment to an open approach involves releasing the full source code.
The code will be released under the GNU Public Licence (GPL) v3; this licence allows
anyone to download, compile, reverse engineer or modify the system. It has important
consequences for the development phase: no software libraries may be compiled into the
system that are not also released under an open source licence that is compatible with
the GPL v3. It also means that no patent-encumbered code may be included.
1.4. Summary
This document describes the overall design philosophy of the system, the components
that need to be implemented to produce a complete system, and the interfaces between
the various components.
Section 4.1 gives an overview, and discusses the principles behind the design structure,
and the context in which the system will be deployed. A full system design then follows.
In Section 4.2, we describe the tables that need to be precomputed for e cient operation
of the system, and the algorithms that can be used to generate the tables. Section 4.3
then introduces the problem of distributed ballot generation, and the design detail for
the programs that implement this part of the system. Next, in Section 4.4, we discuss the
mechanism for on-demand printing of paper ballots (including ballots for those who are
voting out of their home district). The Mixnet manager, which oversees the operation
of the Mixnet, is then presented in Section 4.5. Issues around key management are dealt
with in Section 4.6. Sections 4.7 and 4.8 then describe the distributed web bulletin
board that provides a robust and fault-tolerant view of all public data generated during
the whole election process. Finally, in Appendix A.1, the requirements on the external
Mixnet component are described: a distributed component responsible for ensuring that
all votes are provably correctly shu✏ed and that no individual machine (including the
Mixnet manager) can discover anything about the permutation.
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1.5. Project Contributors
The following people have participated in discussions and contributed to the design
described in this document: Craig Burton, Chris Culnane, James Heather, Thea Pea-
cock, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Steve Schneider, Sriram Srinivasan, Vanessa Teague, Roland
Wen, Douglas Wikstro¨m and Zhe Xia. Earlier stages of the design are described in
[BCH+12a, BCH+12b].
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3. Glossary
Ballot In general, a ballot is used by the voter to cast her vote. But in this document,
a ballot will pass through several stages in which it has di↵erent forms. A paper
ballot or printed ballot is a physical ballot in which the candidate ordering is
human readable. A digital ballot is stored digitally in an encrypted form, and only
a party who possesses the correct secret key can read its information. We classify
these two types of ballot when necessary. Otherwise, if we simply mention a ballot
without classifying, the above di↵erence does not matter and it can be either a
printed ballot or a digital ballot.
Ballot counter A unique value assigned to each ballot. It records which ciphertexts are
contained by a particular ballot. In the distributed ballot generation phase, this
allows the ciphertexts of all ballots to be shu✏ed together rather than using a
separate Mixnet for each ballot.
Ballot manager A single server architecture whose sole role is to apportion serial num-
bers.
Candidate identifier A publicly known numerical value assigned to each candidate. If
we want to generate an encryption for a candidate, we encrypt this value rather
than the candidate name.
CSV: Comma-Separated Values A simple text format in which the stored information
is separated by commas.
Distributed ballot generation Ballots are generated by a number of independent parties
in a distributed fashion, so that no single party learns the ballot information, and
no single party controls the randomisation values used in the ballots.
Early voting The voting phase that takes place before Election Day. It lasts for around
2 weeks.
EBM: Electronic Ballot Marker A device to aid the voter in marking her vote choices.
End-to-end voter-verifiable election system A system in which all stages of the elec-
tion can be publicly verified: individual voters are able to check that their votes
have not been tampered with, and anyone is able to verify the final election tally.
LA, LC, ATL, BTL Legislative Assembly, Legislative Council, Above-the-Line and Below-
the-Line respectively. These are aspects of Victorian voting: LA and LC are the
two houses that are elected, and ATL and BTL are two ways of casting a vote for
the LC.
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Key management To manage the signing and encryption keys generated by various
di↵erent components.
Multiparty computation A computation performed by a number of mutually distrusting
parties in such a way that each party can check that the correct result is output.
Normally, some secret is involved in the computation, but no single party will learn
this secret unless all parties collude.
Preˆt a` Voter An end-to-end voter verifiable election system that is suitable (with some
modifications) for VEC elections because of its user-friendly interface and ability
to handle ranked elections with large number of candidates.
Print-on-Demand service A component that allows pre-prepared digital ballots to be
allocated and transferred to a print station in the polling booth, without any
central party learning the contents of these digital ballot.
Print-on-Demand client The machine in the polling station that decrypts the digital
ballot received from the Print-on-Demand service and prints out the physical ballot
for the voter.
QR code A 2D barcode containing stored information that can be easily read by com-
puter devices.
Race identifier A numerical value to record the race information. It is pre-committed
and stored on the WBB.
SDD: Software Design Document This document, which provides the design for the
back end of the vVote election system.
Table building and lookup Algorithms to precompute and interpret a table built to
record the relationship between di↵erent ranking choices and their corresponding
numerical values. When a vote is decrypted, we get a numerical value that must
be decoded to retrieve the voter’s choices. This table enables us to avoid the need
to solve the discrete logarithm problem.
Verifiable Mixnet The distributed component that ensures that all encrypted votes are
publicly and verifiably shu✏ed before decryption. A list of inputs will be processed
by a number of mix servers in sequence. Each mix server collects the list from the
previous mix server, re-encrypts and shu✏es the list, and then outputs the result
to the next mix server; the relationship between the Mixnet input and output will
be kept secret unless all these mix servers collude. Each mix server also publishes
a proof of correct operation, so that the correctness of the Mixnet can be publicly
verified.
Vote packing Each vote contains several ciphertexts. Vote packing is combining mul-
tiple ciphertexts into one in order to improve the performance of the Mixnet pro-
cessing the votes.
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WBB: Web Bulletin Board It contains two services: a public facing website (called
Public WBB) and an internal facing WBB (called Peered WBB or just WBB).
The Peered WBB is run by a number of peers in a distributed fashion. It receives
submissions in real time and provides appropriate administration of what to be
published on the Public WBB. Once some information is written to the Public
WBB, the information can not be altered or removed. Moreover, the information
can be read by anyone, and everyone’s view of the Public WBB is the same.
14
4. Overall Description
4.1. Design Concerns
The overall design is based on the Preˆt a` Voter voting system [CRS05, RS06, XSH+07,
RBH+09]. The vVote system [BCH+12a, BCH+12b] has taken the principles of Preˆt a`
Voter and applied them to the setting of a VEC election. The overall election system
must be end-to-end verifiable and without single points of trust, so that every step of
the process can be verified by the voter or independent agents, but without revealing to
any individual party or machine how an individual voter voted.
End-to-end schemes typically rely on advanced cryptography and multi-party compu-
tation protocols. This document will not describe the underlying details of such protocols
or techniques, since they are covered in academic publications (Section 1.5 gives refer-
ences for the results and techniques used in this design); however, it will refer to the
properties and functions that are provided by such protocols and techniques.
4.1.1. Overview of Design
The key principle behind vVote is the ability to issue a printed record that allows the
voters to verify the inclusion of their vote in the tally, without revealing how they voted.
This is achieved using the randomised candidate ordering technique introduced in Preˆt a`
Voter, and a printed ballot separable into two halves. In the original Preˆt a` Voter scheme,
the voter is issued with a physical ballot that has the candidate names on one side in
a randomised order, and the vote boxes (to be filled by the voter) on the other side, as
illustrated in Figure 4.1. Additionally, underneath the vote boxes is the permutation of
the candidate order, encrypted under a thresholded public key to which no individual
person or machine holds the decryption key. Down the middle of the page, between the
candidate names and the vote boxes, is a perforation line. The voter marks her choices in
the vote boxes and tears down the perforation line. The side with the candidate names
is then shredded, and the voter submits the vote boxes to the system, and keeps a copy
of the completed boxes, signed by the system. The system is not able thereby to learn
how the voter voted, because the ordering of candidate names is shredded before the
vote boxes are scanned; the vote boxes on their own do not reveal the vote. The records
of the choices are made available online, allowing voters to verify that their votes are
included, unaltered, in the count.
The votes are counted by decrypting the permutation that is included (encrypted) with
the choices. In order to prevent the printed record being associated with a decrypted
vote, the submitted choices are securely and verifiably mixed multiple times by a Mixnet
consisting of a collection of Mixnet peers. At the end of this process, provided that at
15
Edward
Alice
Charles
Betty
David
(a)
Edward 3
Alice 5
Charles 1
Betty 2
David 4
(b)
3
5
1
2
4
(c)
Figure 4.1.: Preˆt a` Voter ballot: (a) blank; (b) completed; (c) record of choices
least one peer has behaved honestly, there is no traceable link between an encrypted vote
and its decrypted output; however, the proofs supplied by the Mixnet will guarantee that
the set of encrypted votes does correspond (as a whole) to the set of decrypted votes.
The rest of this document will supply further details of these procedures.
An election has three fundamental phases:
Pre-election preparation of election materials prior to polls opening
Vote Casting the process of collecting and recording the votes cast
Post-election the tallying of the votes to obtain the result
These three phases exist in the traditional paper voting scenario and also in the vVote
system described in this document. The exact nature of the processes undertaken during
each period is di↵erent, but fundamentally they have the same overall goal.
4.1.2. Pre-election
During this period the system must prepare digital ballots, in a fashion analogous to
that in which ballots would need to be prepared in a paper-based election. However,
owing to the randomised candidate ordering, each ballot is unique. It is important that
no single party knows the ordering of any particular ballot; as part of the design, this
document will specify a Distributed Ballot Generation protocol for creating these digital
ballots. It forms the viewpoint specified in Section 4.3. The outcome of the Distributed
Ballot Generation Protocol will be randomised ballots in an encrypted form, such that
no single party knows anything about the permutation of the candidates.
Elections in Victoria, and in particular the Below-The-Line (BTL) ranked races, have
a large number of candidates, often in the region of 35 candidates in a single race.
Each ballot contains one ciphertext per candidate, and so if someone casts a BTL vote,
all the ciphertexts for that ballot will need to be included in the mix. Multiplying the
number of cryptographic operations that are required by a factor of 35 could easily make
the computation infeasible within the time and resource constraints, however; and so, a
Vote Packing technique is specified in the viewpoint in Section 4.5.4. This packs multiple
ciphertexts into a single ciphertext to speed up the mixing and decrypting of the votes.
It does, however, result in the need to construct a lookup table of all the possible voting
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permutations in order to decode the decrypted value. This “Table Building” stage must
be performed as part of the Pre-election, and possibly even several weeks ahead of the
election. The “Table Building” is a computationally expensive task; however, the table
lookup is very quick.
There are a number of di↵erent components involved in the running the election.
Each component requires, at the very least, a signing key and corresponding public
key certificate. This will include all EBM, Print, and Audit stations. The number
of keys required is likely therefore to be of the order of several hundred. An internal
Certificate Authority (CA) will be operated to sign the Certificate Signing Requests from
the components. There is no need to use an external CA, since the network is closed,
and the purpose of the signing and authentication is internal to the vVote system. This
greatly reduces the cost since there is no per-certificate cost, and it provides greater
flexibility. There are a number of open source CA packages: a suitable one will be
selected. Prior to the start of the election the relevant Certificate Signing Requests will
be created by the components and authorised centrally.
Additionally, the Mixnet must be set up and key generation must be performed. The
setup of the Mixnet involves exchanging configuration files between each peer to ensure
they are all aware of one another and able to communicate with one another. This
service will be provided as part of the Mixnet, but will need to be jointly run by the
various mix servers at the same time. This may happen as part of the Mixnet manager
or as a separate one-o↵ configuration step. The key generation procedure will be run
through the Mixnet manager. Individual keys for other components will be generated
locally by each component during its initialisation, with appropriate Certificate Signing
Requests being produced.
All fixed values should also be committed to the WBB—for example, Candidate Iden-
tifiers, Race Identifiers and cryptographic group descriptions.
4.1.3. Vote Casting
The Vote Casting stage encompasses everything that will take place while the election
is running. Because the election allows Early Voting, this phase will last around two
weeks. There will be down time overnight for some components, but not all. Since votes
could be cast from out of state, including overseas, the central system must be up and
running whenever a poll station is open anywhere in the world.
One of the fundamental components covered in this design is the Print on Demand
(POD) service. This allows pre-prepared digital ballots to be allocated and transferred
to a print station in the polling booth, without any central party learning the contents
of the ballot. The only machine that could ever see the contents of the ballot will be
those in the polling station used either to print the ballot out or to cast the vote. The
voter will interact with the POD service in order to get a physical ballot, before taking
it to the EBM to cast the vote. Issues surrounding printing on demand are discussed
in [Rya06].
The EBM (an external front-end component not detailed in this design document)
will interact with the Web Bulletin Board to submit the vote and receive a digitally
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Figure 4.2.: Overview of Design
signed receipt of the vote. This receipt will be printed out for the voter to take home.
The receipt does not reveal any information about the candidates the voter has voted
for, because it does not list the (randomised) candidate ordering.
The WBB is primarily used during the election, although it will be operational
throughout to record and commit ballot data generated during the pre- and post-election
stages. The WBB will be a key viewpoint discussed in this document.
There will be various administrative machines in poll stations to handle situations
such as cancelling a vote if there is a problem during submission.
4.1.4. Post Election
The post election stage is focused on mixing and decrypting the votes. The votes need to
be verifiably mixed in order to prevent anyone linking a decrypted plaintext vote with a
submitted, encrypted, vote. The actual mixing will be performed by a verifiable Mixnet,
which does not form part of this design document. However, the preparation of the files
for the Mixnet, and the software to manage the running of the Mixnet, is part of this
document and will form a viewpoint discussed here.
Figure 4.2 shows a high level overview of the design and how the various di↵erent
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components will interact. In later sections we will provide individual viewpoints of each
of the components. This design document contains the following viewpoints:
• WBB
• Table Building
• Print on Demand (POD) Service
• Distributed Ballot Generation
• Mixnet Manager
• Key Management
There are additional areas that will be covered; for example, network security and
various administrative processes that will need to be implemented. However, these will
not form separate viewpoints in this document. In general, polling station processes
and procedures are not directly covered by this document. However, the communication
between the components in the polling station and the back-end services is detailed here.
4.2. Table Building
4.2.1. Summary
The table-building process is an important step for e ciency. It is required to allow us
to combine a permutation of multiple candidate ciphertexts into a single ciphertext for
mixing, in such a way that we can unambiguously recover the permutation. Recovering
the permutation is computationally intensive, so we take the approach of creating a
look-up table to enable recovery to be e cient at run-time. The combining step greatly
improves the e ciency of the mixing and thus reduces the time required before the
tally can be produced. Although the construction of the table is a time-consuming and
resource-intensive task, it can be performed in public (in that no secret information
is involved, so it could be performed by a cloud service or on a cluster), and can be
computed in advance of the election.
The table provides a means for e cient extraction of the permutation of candidates
from its encoding as an exponent. It provides a mapping from the permutations of
candidates
Q
(CIRankj
j mod p)mod p (see Algorithm 1 below) to the permutation Rankj ,
and needs to be pre-constructed since this extraction cannot be done e ciently in real-
time.
4.2.2. Candidate Identifiers
Each candidate, or party, is allocated a candidate identifier CI. (This will become clearer
when looking at the Distributed Ballot Generation phase.) The candidate identifier is a
value selected from the underlying group.
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Candidate Identifiers must be unique at the point of decryption. The same underlying
candidate identifier can be used in multiple districts/regions/races with the aid of a
district identifier. This simplifies the table building process and allows the use of a single
table for the entire election. It minimises space required and improves the e ciency of
building the table.
If the underlying group is an Elliptic Curve group, the candidate identifiers will be
points on that elliptic curve. Each one will be a co-ordinate (x, y) as opposed to a single
value. However, the x and y co-ordinates can be concatenated and treated as a single
value provided the uniqueness requirement holds.
4.2.3. Base Value baseV alue
In order to encode several vote preferences (of a list of preferences) for candidates within
a single data value, we first require a base value b. We use powers of b to represent the
candidates, so candidate ci is represented by bi. The preferences can then be encoded
by multiplying each candidate value by its preference, and taking the sum of all these
values, in the style of Baudron counting [BFP+01]. For example, if candidate 3 has
preference 1, candidate 1 has preference 2, candidate 4 has preference 3, and candidate
2 has preference 4, the selection would be represented as
1.b3 + 2.b1 + 3.b4 + 4.b2 = 3.b4 + 1.b3 + 4.b2 + 2.b1
Henceforth we will use the name baseV alue as a meaningful variable name, rather than
b.
A concrete choice of baseV alue must be agreed upon prior to the election and start of
table building. It must be larger than the maximum possible number of candidates, and
should be committed to on the WBB and made public. We recommend that the value
be derived from a hashed string to prevent any chances of manipulation. We recommend
something along the lines of SHA256(‘VECVotePacking’). The string used should be
agreed by key stakeholders. Once a value has been selected it needs to be transformed
using a pre-agreed method into a value that is in the subgroup, or on the curve in the
case of Elliptic Curves. In fact the manipulations will be carried out on the exponents
of the group generator g, as shown in Algorithms 1 and 2 below. This is to enable
the manipulations to be carried out homomorphically on candidate identifiers encrypted
under ElGamal, as shown later in Algorithm 3 in Section 4.5.4.
4.2.4. Permutation Generation
The table holds every possible permutation of the votes for a given packing size PS.
We recommend a packing of size 6 initially1, although the construction phase should
receive the packing size as a parameter and act accordingly. The actual table is the
1The selection of such a value needs to take into account the balance between computational speed and
storage space. By increasing this value, the mixnets and the decryption phase will be more e cient,
but the size of the look up table will grow. The reverse is also true: by decreasing this value, the
mixnets and the decryption will be less e cient, but the size of the look up table will decrease.
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concatenation of all tables for 1 to PS. This allows us to handle partial rankings and
races with fewer than PS candidates.
Table construction
Construct Candidate Identifiers (could be read in from a file)
foreach i in n do
CIi = g(baseV alue
i mod q) mod p;
end
Algorithm 1: Construct Candidate Identifiers
foreach subset S of {1, . . . , n} of size PS do
foreach permutation p of S (p1 to pPS) do
Tablep =
Q
j(CIpj
j mod p)mod p;
end
end
Algorithm 2: Candidate Permutations
The result of the calculation would be stored into the table as Tablep along with the
respective candidate permutation p in plaintext. Once the tables of all di↵erent sizes
have been created, the table should be sorted completely and optimised for searching.
The table should provide rapid searching of candidate permutations based on the lookup
values calculated.
4.3. Distributed Ballot Generation
4.3.1. Summary
The distributed ballot generation provides a verifiable way to produce ballots with a
permuted list of candidates, without having to trust any single entity. No single device
or entity learns the final permutation. The distributed ballot generation process will
produce digital ballots that are encrypted under the POD Service’s public key. The
approach is described in [Rya06, RT10].
The digital ballots will be committed to the WBB prior to their use. The aim is to
produce all necessary digital ballots prior to the start of the election; however, if that is
not possible, digital ballots may be committed during the election, as long as they are
not used until they have been committed by the WBB onto the public WBB.
4.3.2. What is a ballot?
A digital ballot consists of a collection of candidate ciphertexts, grouped into individual
races. The ballot in the state of Victoria consists of two races, a Legislative Assembly
(LA) race and a Legislative Council (LC) race. The Legislative Assembly consists of
approximately 8 candidates that the voter will rank; there is one LA race for each of
the 88 districts in Victoria. The Legislative Council race is larger, and run at a regional
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level; there are eight regions across Victoria. A Legislative Council race consists of
two voting options, Above The Line (LCATL) and Below The Line (LCBTL). ATL
voting allows a voter to choose a party; the tallying rules say that such a ballot must
be counted as if it were a BTL ballot filled in according to that party’s pre-published
full preference ranking of all candidates. BTL voting requires the voter rank all the
(roughly 20–40) candidates. Consequently, there is a ciphertext for each candidate in
the Legislative Assembly, one for each ATL Party in the Legislative Council, and one for
each BTL candidate in the Legislative Council. Each ballot therefore has in the region of
50 unique ciphertexts. These ciphertexts are permuted within their groups, LA, LCATL,
LCBTL. The ciphertexts are not permuted across the groupings. The digital ballot will
also contain a plaintext serial number that the voter can use as part of the verification
process; in addition, the physical ballot contains a digitally signed copy of that serial
number, embedded in a barcode.
What is in the ciphertexts?
Each ciphertext contains a pre-committed candidate identifier (or party identifier in the
case of LCATL). This candidate identifier is a value from the underlying group that
is used in the ElGamal encryption [Gam85]. Each identifier must be unique across
all elections. Candidate Identifiers should be selected in a manner that is compatible
with the table-building process described above. Where a race does not involve table
building, the candidate identifier may be selected at random from the underlying group.
Care should be taken to ensure that it is unique across the race/election.
Ballot Format
The physical ballot will be produced in a format specified by the VEC with the appro-
priate text and layout. The physical ballot will contain the serial number, printed in
plaintext, as well as a QR Code. The serial number will be of the following form:
DistrictIdentifier : SerialNo
A list of district of identifiers will be provided to the ballot generation software. An
example of a serial number is as follows:
NTH : 245
which refers to Northcote district, ballot 245. The contents of the barcode will be
produced by the Print On Demand Client (POD Client) in the poll station, using the
data provided by the POD Service. This will consist of a signed serial number and the
appropriate candidate ciphertexts. The permutation information will be derived by the
POD Client itself, since this information is not known to the POD Service.
4.3.3. Interface to VEC Election Management System
The list of candidates, parties, and races, will be provided in a CSV format from the
VEC central system. This will consist of 3 separate files:
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1. VEC-areas.csv
2. VEC-lower.csv
3. VEC-upper.csv
VEC-areas
This file contains 2 values per row in the following format:
region, district
A region contains a number of districts; each district belongs to only one region. In
consequence, each region appears in multiple rows, while each district appears only once.
The recommended way of handling this file is to construct a folder hierarchy based on
this structure. It will contain the following:
Regions
RegionName1
DistrictName1
DistrictName2
RegionName2
DistrictName3
DistrictName4
For example:
Regions
Eastern Metropolitan
Bayswater
Box Hill
Donchaster
VEC-lower
This file defines the lower house race and consists of 4 values per row:
District , CandidateName , Index , PartyName
The data contained within this file should be used to produce a list of candidate names,
parties and identifiers for a particular district. The list should be in the order of the
index values. The Party Name can be blank if a candidate is not a liated to a party. It
is recommended that this list is stored in the respective folder of the hierarchy created
above.
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VEC-upper
This file contains the data regarding the upper house, regional, races. It consists of 8
columns per row:
Region , Grouping , GroupingAlphaIndex , GroupingIndex , CandidateName , Party , Town , Index
The region is self-explanatory; the Grouping refers to how the candidate is to be
grouped and thus also defines an entry for the ATL portion of the ballot. This is
important because some parties (coalitions in particular) submit joint ATL lists, and so
the candidate party may not be the same as the grouping party. Each party listed in
a region in the Grouping column should have an entry in the ATL list. The Grouping
AlphaIndex and GroupingIndex refer to party ordering and are not needed during ballot
generation. The candidate name and party are important for the BTL section of the
ballot. The remaining two columns are not needed for ballot generation.
Once the various data files have been constructed, the next stage is to process this
data. The processing step should generate a election specification file that will hold
all the relevant parameters for each race. These will include the location of the public
key, the location to store output files and whether the votes in that race are to be
packed or not. This file will be used during the next stage to create the initial candidate
identifiers and to prepare the initial ciphertexts for submission to the WBB and for
ballot generation.
4.3.4. Initial Ciphertext Generation
The first step in the ballot generation stage is to produce a starting list of verifiable
ciphertexts that can be passed to the Mixnet. In order to do this, a list of candidate
identifiers must be generated. This step is dependent on whether the ciphertexts are
due to be packed using the Vote Packing technique described in 4.5.4.
Candidate Identifier—No Packing
In situations where the ciphertexts will not be packed, candidate identifiers can be
arbitrary elements of the underlying group. To avoid reuse of candidate identifiers
across di↵erent elections these will be randomly generated. The first step is to generate
a random number r, then create a random identifier that is in the underlying group, as
follows:
gr mod p
This value should be recorded next to a candidate name and submitted to the WBB.
This identifier will be the plaintext that is initially encrypted.
Candidate Identifier—With Packing
When the ciphertexts are to be packed, the candidate identifier is linked with the Vote
Packing table generation. The candidate identifier is the following:
g(baseV alue
index mod q) mod p
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where baseV alue is equal to the baseV alue used during the table construction in the
vote packing, and index is the index of the candidate in the list of candidate names.
Having constructed our candidate values, they should initially be encrypted with an
ElGamal random value of zero, and the result published to the WBB. Others can use
this to verify that the initial encryption was performed correctly, because the random
value is fixed at zero and the candidate identifiers have been made public. After mixing,
the proofs of mixing and re-encryption provide a guarantee that this initial list has been
correctly mixed and re-encrypted, thus providing an overall proof that the ciphertexts
have been correctly constructed.
4.3.5. Ballot Counter
In general, to achieve the ballot generation in a distributed fashion, the ciphertexts of
each ballot need to go through a separate Mixnet. However, for large scale elections,
e.g., millions of potential voters, this will cause the ballot generation phase to be very
time consuming, since we need to run the Mixnet millions of times. Instead, we use
a ballot counter here to record which ciphertexts are contained by a particular ballot.
The benefit is that the ciphertexts of all ballots can be shu✏ed by a single run of the
Mixnet, and in the Mixnet’s outputs, we can separate the ciphertexts of di↵erent ballots
according to the ballot counter.
The process for creating the complete list and ballot counter is as follows:
1. Firstly, we assign a unique ballotCounter to each ballot. This could take into
account the race and district information. For example, ballots of di↵erent dis-
tricts can be generated together provided that a record is kept of which race each
ballotCounter refers to.
2. Next, we create a pseudo ciphertext for each ballotCounter, using value 0 as the
special randomness. This pseudo cipher is denoted as Enc(ballotCounter).
3. Then for each ballot, we collect its ciphertexts which encrypt the candidate identi-
fiers, and append the corresponding Enc(ballotCounter) to each of its ciphertexts
to form a two-column structure.
As a result, for all ballots, the result should be two column structure with the number
of rows given by numberBallots⇥ numberCandidates. Each set of ciphertexts belong-
ing to the same ballot should have the same ballotCounter. The number of separate
instantiations of the mixing should be minimised (with one important caveat, which will
be explained shortly); consequently, it is highly likely that the most e cient approach
will be to generate multiple districts or regions together. The mapping between distric-
t/region and ballotCounter should be submitted to the WBB with the complete list.
This allows a verifier to check the complete initial list is correct.
Broadly speaking, it is desirable that the number of instantiations of the mix should
be minimised: this reduces the overheads and improves the e ciency. However, a bal-
ance must be sought when instantiating very large mixes. The mixing requires that a
threshold of the parties performing the mixing remain online throughout. If the mixing
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is anticipated to take more than a few hours it is prudent to split the work up into
separate instantiations, to mitigate the loss of time if the mix were to fail and need to
be restarted as a result of network or system failure.
4.3.6. Mixing
The mixing will be performed by the Mixnet. The exact details are not covered here;
however, an overview of steps is given.
The two column list needs to be exported from the WBB into the Mixnet required
format. The mix servers will have been prepared in advanced in order that they have
generated the required keys and have set up the necessary network connections. The
Ballot Generation Mix can be started via the Mixnet manager. Once this has completed,
the output list of ciphertexts should be submitted to the WBB along with the Proof
directory. At this point, the first column of data should be decrypted. (Note that it is
essential that only the first column is decrypted.) This will provide a list of ciphertexts
that have been appropriately mixed. The decrypted first column provides an identifier for
extracting the relevant ciphertexts for each race. For each ballotCounter used, extract
the ciphertexts in the order they are given in the list. This set of ciphertexts is the
permuted set of ciphertexts that will form part of a complete ballot. Having organised
the ciphertexts into their ballotCounter groups the ciphertexts should now be grouped
on a ballot-wide basis.
It will be necessary to generate more copies of the regional ciphertexts than of the
district ciphertexts (since regions are subdivided into districts); the exact numbers will
be provided as a parameter. Combine each group of district ciphertexts, both ATL and
BTL, with the relevant regional ciphertexts. This gives an overarching grouping that
forms a digital ballot. Each digital ballot should be issued with a plaintext serial number
in the format specified above; the complete list should then be submitted to the WBB
as the ballot ciphertexts.
4.3.7. Key Transformation
The final step of the ballot generation procedure is the key transformation protocol.
This transforms the ciphertexts from encryption under the public key of the election
into encryption under the public key of the Print on Demand service.
We transform a message under one key into a message under another key without
revealing the underlying message [Jak99]. This needs to be performed in a way that is
verifiable both to the other parties taking part and to the general public. We assume
that the two di↵erent key pairs were generated from the same group description. We
have the following prerequisites:
• There is a joint public key y, whose corresponding secret key x is shared amongst
t ballot generation servers
• There is a joint public key z, whose corresponding secret key w is shared amongst
s POD servers
26
• Both keypairs share the same g value
• The message from the ballot generation mix is of the form (u, v) = (gr,myr)
Most of the calculations for the Key Transformation can be performed in public and
would commonly be performed by the WBB. However, the presence of a distributed
WBB makes this process harder, and so we utilise a pre-commitment stage to simplify
the process during runtime. This is of particular important during the Print On De-
mand protocol that makes use of the same key transformation technique, except it must
perform it in real-time. There are therefore two stages, a pre-commitment that must
be performed prior to the start of the election and any key transformations, and a live
portion that is performed during the run of the actual protocols.
Pre-Commitment Stage
Each server (whether it is the Ballot Generation Servers during ballot generation or
Print On Demand Servers during Print On Demand) i performs the following k times,
where k is from 1 to numberBallots⇥ numberCandidates
• Select a random value ei and fi
• Calculate gei ,yei and gfi , zfi along with a proof that the respective ei and fi are
the same2
• Submits gei ,yei and gfi , zfi along with the respective proofs and the value of k, all
signed by i, to the WBB
• The WBB will commit to these values at the end of the day. Ideally a separate
commitment would be made to the Public WBB to ease checking of signatures
later, but it is not essential.
• Following the commitment to the Public WBB each i downloads the set of all
committed to values and verifies the WBB signatures and server signatures.
Live Stage
Each server i performs the following:
• The Server calculates the following using the values obtained from the Public WBB
during the Pre-Commitment Stage:
u00 =
tY
i=1
gfi (4.1)
u0 = u⇥
tY
i=1
gei (4.2)
v0 = v ⇥
tY
i=1
(zfi ⇥ yei) (4.3)
2this is a standard ⌃-proof of re-encryption
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• The above values are submitted by i to the WBB
• Each server i performs a partial decryption, along with proof generation, for
each (u0, v0)
• The partial decryptions and proofs are sent to the WBB. In the case of the Print
On Demand protocol they are also returned to the POD Client
• The values can be combined by the POD Client or any public service to form the
output v00
v00 = zf ⇥m
where f =
Pt
i=1 fi.
At the end of the process, we have (u00, v00) = (gf ,mzf ), which is the same message m
as we started with, but now under a di↵erent key. These ciphertexts, along with all
proofs of the transformation and decryption, should be published on the WBB. The
only values that should not be published, and which must be destroyed, are the random
values ei and fi.
4.3.8. Batch Verification
At an abstract level, a ⌃-proof works as follows: firstly the prover makes some com-
mitment and sends the commitment to the verifier; then the verifier randomly selects a
challenge and sends it back to the prover (or the prover can generate the challenge herself
using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86] in order to make the proof non-interactive); finally
the prover uses her private knowledge to compute some values, denoted as L and R, and
then makes them public. To verify the ⌃-proof, the verifier uses some public functions
f(x) and g(x) to verify whether f(L) = g(R). If the verifier needs to verify a number of
independent ⌃-proofs, instead of verifying them separately, she can use batch verifica-
tion [BGR98] to verify all these proofs together. To achieve this, the verifier randomly
selects a value ei for each of the ⌃-proofs, then the equation
Q
i f(Li)ei =
Q
i g(Ri)ei will
imply that for every i, we have f(Li) = g(Ri). In our case, a digital ballot will contain
a number of ciphers, and for each cipher, we need to prove that the above key transfor-
mation has been correctly performed. Thanks to batch verification, one combined proof
will be enough to prove that all ciphers have been transformed correctly.
4.3.9. POD Servers
Each POD Server receives a copy of the transformed ciphertext, which it will use during
the POD protocol detailed in Section 4.4.1. The POD server can independently verify
that the final ciphertext it gets is correct using the information on the WBB.
28
Print Station
Voter
PoD Service Distributed WBB
Print Station
Voter
Registration
Voter
Poll Worker
Ballot Manager
Figure 4.3.: Overview of Print on Demand
4.4. Print on Demand Service
The goal of the Print on Demand Service is to provide distribution of digital ballots
for any district at any poll station in real-time. The components involved are shown in
Figure 4.3.
The ciphertexts for ballots need to be pre-constructed and committed to the WBB.
We therefore cannot create digital ballots in the polling station on demand: we need to
distribute previously constructed ballots. The ballot generation procedure given above
describes how such digital ballots are constructed and how they are transformed into
encryptions under the public key of the POD Service. The same key transformation
procedure described above will again be used during the Print on Demand protocol, to
transform the digital ballot into the designated printer’s public key.
4.4.1. Print on Demand Protocol
Figure 4.4 provides a message sequence chart of the Print on Demand protocol.
4.4.2. Entities
Voter
This is an abstraction of a voter. The voter is assumed to have some additional func-
tionality, for example, the ability to check signatures.
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Figure 4.4.: Message Sequence Chart of Print on Demand Protocol
Poll Worker
This is a combined abstraction of the poll worker and the system the poll worker is
using. Later in the document we will provide a more explicit split of the tasks, but for
the sake of this protocol the two roles can be combined.
POD Service
This will be a thresholded service that uses some form of joint/threshold signatures.
For simplicity in the message sequence chart it is treated as a single entity. When a
signature is issued in a message or a decryption/encryption, it should be considered as
if a threshold of the POD Servers have co-operated to perform that action.
POD Client
This will be a tablet with an attached printer or similar. It will be located in a booth-type
structure to provide privacy, but will be online.
Ballot Manager
The ballot manager will be a single server architecture whose only role is to apportion
serial numbers. This is utilised to simplify the process of assigning a serial number
30
without having to run a complex agreement protocol. It does not need to be trusted,
since its assignments must be backed by a signed confirmation from the WBB.
Web Bulletin Board
This is the bulletin board as described in other design documents. It will also be a
threshold-based service, but for the sake of simplicity we abstract it to a single entity.
Like the POD Service, when it issues a signature, it is a joint/threshold-based signature.
4.4.3. Description of POD Protocol
The following describes a typical use case for the POD Protocol.
A voter walks into the polling station and presents appropriate ID to the poll worker.
The poll worker checks the voter o↵ on the register and requests the administrator
machine to generate a random sessionID. This sessionID is just a random number,
containing no identifying information. If the POD Client is separate to the administrator
device the sessionID could be in the form of a 2D barcode, magnetic strip card or
even a smart card; it could also be selected from a box by the poll worker or by the
voter. However, it is currently assumed to be generated by the administrator machine
controlled by the poll worker. Having generated, or scanned, the sessionID, the poll
worker submits it, along with the district of the voter, to the POD Service. The POD
Service signs the sessionID and stores this information in its database. When the poll
worker has received confirmation of reception, he either hands the sessionID to the
voter or submits it, via his administrator machine, to the POD Client.
It could be that the POD Client is attached to the administrator machine, if the
ballots are to be printed at the registration desk. If they are to be printed in a separate,
private, booth the signed sessionID will be produced in barcode form and handed to
the voter. We maintain the abstraction of a POD Client device, even in the case of its
being attached to the administrator machine, to distinguish the roles being performed.
If the POD Client is separate, the voter moves to the POD Client and scans the barcode
(sessionID). (Alternatively, the POD Client can be pre-loaded with the sessionID by
the administrator machine.) The POD Client signs the sessionID and submits it to the
POD Service. The POD Service looks up the district it recorded previously. It signs
both the district and the sessionID and submits the result to the Ballot Manager. The
Ballot Manager looks up the next available serial number for that district and assigns it
to the submitted sessionID. It then notifies the WBB of this assignment and waits for
signed confirmation of the assignment from the WBB. This signed response is returned
to the POD Service. The POD Service will only release an actual ballot once it receives a
signed serialNo and sessionID from the WBB. The POD Service transforms the relevant
ciphertexts into the relevant printer’s public key. It then signs the serialNo and returns
both the signed serial number and the transformed ciphertexts to the POD Client. The
POD Client decrypts the ciphertexts and prints the resulting plaintexts, along with the
signed serial number and any other relevant information (for example, the permutation
needed by the EBM).
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The content of a ballot is a collection of ciphertexts, one for each of the n candidates
on the ballot. The key transformation will therefore be performed n times, and n
candidate ciphertexts will be returned to the POD Client. The proofs of decryption
and key transformation will be submitted to the WBB as evidence that the voter can
later check. The details of the key transformation are identical to those used during the
distributed ballot generation, except for the keys used. Here we are transforming from
the POD Service key to an individual POD Client key; since this is performed on a per
ballot basis, it must be done individually rather than using the batch approach adopted
during the distributed ballot generation. This will have an impact on the number of
proofs produced, since it will not be possible to generate batch proofs across multiple
ballots.
4.4.4. Data Format
Communication between the client and servers will be performed using JSON. The basic
structure is as follows:
Listing 4.1: Poll Worker Request
{
"district" : "Northcote",
"nonce" : "RandomV alue",
"signature" : "SignPWK{district, nonce}",
}
Listing 4.2: Poll Worker Response
{
"signature" : "SignPOD{Nonce}",
}
Listing 4.3: POD Client Request
{
"nonce" : "RandomV alue",
"signature" : "SignPODC{Nonce}",
}
Listing 4.4: POD Client Response
{
"serialno" : "NTH:123" ,
"signature" : "SignPODS{SerialNo}",
"candidates" : [
{" alpha ":"gr" , "beta ":"Cand1 ⇥ yr" },
{" alpha ":"gr1" , "beta ":"Cand2 ⇥ yr1" },
{" alpha ":"gr2" , "beta ":"Cand3 ⇥ yr2" },
{" alpha ":"gr3" , "beta ":"Candn ⇥ yr3" },
]
}
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4.4.5. Threshold Decryption and Key Transformation
The key transformation protocol requires a decryption of each ciphertext during the
key transformation. In the ballot generation phase we can use the built in decryption
routine included in the Mixnet, since we will be operating on large batches and relatively
few runs of the protocol. A threshold cryptography approach [DF89, Ped91] must be
implemented for the POD Service. The construction of the joint public key and secret
keys should be performed in a distributed manner to ensure that no single party has
knowledge of the complete secret key.
4.4.6. Auditing
The auditing procedure provides a method of auditing the actions of the Print on De-
mand Client. In standard Preˆt a` Voter, the process is used to audit the construction
of the physical ballot. However, with the distributed ballot generation detailed in Sec-
tion 4.3, the construction of the underlying ballot data, including the ciphertexts sub-
mitted to the WBB and the ciphertexts held by the POD Service, can be audited by
checking the proofs created by the ballot generation mix and key transformation pro-
tocol. These proofs can be checked for all digital ballots, and not just those that are
audited; assurance can thereby be obtained that the ciphertexts on the WBB and the
ciphertexts held by the POD Service are well formed. However, this check does not
provide assurance that the POD Client has performed honestly and accurately. For this,
we need an audit process to check that the final step is performed correctly.
As mentioned above, when a physical ballot is printed out, the ciphertexts are trans-
formed into the key for the POD Client device and then sent to the device. Those ci-
phertexts cannot then be decrypted by anyone other than the POD Client itself. When
a voter receives a printed ballot, she is free to choose to audit the printing of the bal-
lot. To do so, she must go to the Ballot Auditing Station. She will scan the barcode
on the physical ballot, which includes the SerialNo. The SerialNo will be sent to the
WBB in the form of an Audit request, whose structure is detailed in Section 4.7. On
receipt of authorisation from the WBB, the Ballot Audit Station will submit the signed
authorisation, along with the serial number, to the POD Service.
When the POD Service receives an audit request, it will first check that the authorisa-
tion from the WBB is valid. Each POD Server will then decrypt the ciphertexts directly
and construct a signature, under the PODS joint signing key, of the serial number and
plaintexts. Each server will return this signature share to the Ballot Audit Station.
Once the Ballot Audit Station has received a threshold set of these signatures, it com-
bines them and checks the signature is valid and correct for the permutation contained
in the barcode on the ballot paper. It then constructs a receipt to print out with the
signature along with the plaintexts. The Ballot Audit Station is able to construct the
plaintexts from the permutation value that the POD Client placed into the barcode on
the ballot; the POD Service therefore needs communicate only the signature, and not
the plaintexts. If the POD Client has been honest the signature will be valid; otherwise,
any attempts to cheat will be detected.
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SignPODS{SerialNo}
SignADM{SignPODS{SerialNo}}
SignWBB{Audit,SerialNo}
SignWBB{Audit,SerialNo}
SignPODS{Audit,SerialNo,Candidates}
SignPODS{Audit,SerialNo,Candidates}
msc VEC PaV Audit Message Sequence Chart
1
Figure 4.5.: Message Sequence Chart of Audit Protocol
The audit signature along with the plaintexts should be printed onto an audit receipt.
The barcode on the audit receipt should also contain the same data as that within the
ballot barcode. This allows the voter to use a smartphone to scan the physical ballot and
check the signature and reconstruct how the ballot should look for that signature, thus
enabling an independent audit of the ballot without having to trust the Ballot Audit
Station.
Details of the protocol are shown in Figure 4.5.
4.5. Mixnet Manager
The Mixnet manager should provide a simple-to-use command-line and graphical inter-
face to run the processes associated with the mixing of the votes, as well as the mixing
itself. It should provide adequate feedback to assist the administrator to monitor and
react to any problems. The Mixnet manager will perform the following tasks, each of
which will be expanded on in the following sections:
• Mixnet setup
• Ballot Generation
• Download vote data from the WBB
• Check vote data signature
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• Format vote data into Mixnet-compatible format (including vote packing and dis-
trict identifiers)
• Run various mixes and decryptions
• Vote Packing Look-up
• Upload proofs to WBB
• Upload plaintext vote data to the WBB
4.5.1. Mixnet Setup
The Mixnet setup phase will be run prior to the start of the election and before ballot
generation.
4.5.2. Download vote data from the WBB
Each mix server should be prepared to download the vote data from the WBB indepen-
dently. A suitable web-based interface will be provided to allow this to take place. In
certain circumstances, the mix servers may all be located in a single room, and the vote
data will be provided from a single source. In such circumstances, the Mixnet manager
should be capable of accepting such o✏ine data, while still independently checking the
veracity of the data by checking the digital signatures posted to the WBB.
4.5.3. Check vote data signature
The data will have been committed to the WBB each night, and so the list of nightly
signatures will need to be checked. This will involve splitting the downloaded data into
the appropriate daily submissions and checking that the digital signatures covering those
commitments are valid. This should be an automated process that provides feedback to
the user on the successful checking of signatures as well as keeping a log of the signatures
checked. Should a signature fail, a user must be alerted. It should not be possible to
proceed with the mixing until the signatures have been successfully verified.
4.5.4. Format vote data into Mixnet compatible format
The data returned by the WBB will be the raw vote data submitted from the EBM. This
data must be combined with the ciphertexts that were submitted to the WBB during the
ballot generation stage. The first step is to retrieve the appropriate ciphertexts for each
ballot, via the matching serial number. Having retrieved the ciphertexts they should be
ordered by preference. Note, the ciphertexts generated as part of the ballot generation
are in the appropriately permuted order for the ballot and thus the re-ordering is purely
by preference. For example, if there were six ciphertexts (✓a, ✓b, ✓c, ✓d, ✓e, ✓f ) and the
submitted preferences are [3,1,4,6,5,2], the ciphertexts would be re-ordered as follows:
(✓b, ✓f , ✓a, ✓c, ✓e, ✓d). This is the data that would be submitted to the mix servers for the
mixing.
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Vote Packing and Race Identifier
In order to optimise the mixing process and reduce the number of individual mixes that
will need to be run, all the votes for a particular type of race will be mixed together,
even when they come from di↵erent districts. For races which do not use Vote Packing,
the candidate identifier will be unique across the entire election, and no race identifier
needs to be applied. In situations where Vote Packing is being used, a Race Identifier
must be used during the Vote Packing process.
The Race Identifier will be a pre-committed value stored on the WBB. It must be
applied to the Packed Vote only, not the individual ciphertexts. Votes are packed into
groups of size PS, the packing size described in Section 4.2.4. In order to do this, the
set of ordered ciphertexts constructed above are separated into groups of size PS; the
last group can be of size PS or less. For example, if we have n candidates and a set of
ciphertexts Ciphsi from 1 to n, in preference order, the following would be performed
to provide a sequence of PackedCiphs:
j = 1; k = 1;
PackedCiphsk = 1;
for i = 1! n do
PackedCiphsk = (PackedCiphsk ⇥ (Ciphsij mod p)) mod p;
if j == PS then
j = 1; k = k + 1;
PackedCiphsk = 1;
end
j = j + 1;
end
Algorithm 3: Vote Packing Algorithm
Each PackedCiphsk will therefore be an encryption of one of the permutations gen-
erated by Algorithm 2 on Page 21. For example, consider the sequence of ciphertexts
(✓b, ✓f , ✓a, ✓c, ✓e, ✓d), which is ordered by preference. If the packing size PS is 3, then
Algorithm 3 will pack a triple of votes into each packed data value, as follows:
PackedCiphs1 = (✓
1
b ⇥ ✓2f ⇥ ✓3a) mod p
PackedCiphs2 = (✓
1
c ⇥ ✓2e ⇥ ✓3d) mod p
Recall (from Section 4.3.4) that each ✓i is an encrypted candidate identifier, and so of the
form E(gbaseV alue
i mod q mod p). So if candidates a, b, c, . . . are numbered 1, 2, 3, . . . then
the product of powers used to compute the PackedCiphsi combine homomorphically to
provide encryptions of the entries of the table computed in Algorithm 2.
PackedCiphs1 = E(Table(2,6,1))
PackedCiphs2 = E(Table(3,5,4))
Once the votes have been packed accordingly, each PackedCiphs must have the race
identifier applied. The race identifier ri is inferred from the serial number; the appropri-
ate value should be looked up on the WBB. The requirement is that the value ri must
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be in the group Gq, because ri will be multiplied with the PackedCiphs rather than
the plaintext encrypted in the PackedCiphs. There may be multiple race identifiers to
apply—for example, one for the district race and one for the regional race. For each of
the races, the following is performed on the packed ciphertexts:
foreach element pc of the line PackedCiphs do
pc = (pc⇥ ri) mod p;
end
Algorithm 4: Race Identifier Algorithm
Once the ciphertexts have been either packed or placed into the appropriate order,
the data must be converted into a suitable file format for the mix servers.
4.5.5. Run Various Mixes and Decryptions
The Mixnet manager should be configurable to run various mix and decryption oper-
ations on the underlying Mixnet. The Mixnet manager will provide a graphical user
interface for selecting the appropriate Mixnet to be run. It will provide protection
against accidental running of stages; for example, key generation after a key has already
been generated. The Mixnet manager will also provide feedback on the currently running
Mixnet, to enable the end user detect any errors or connectivity problems.
4.5.6. Vote Packing Look-up
Following the decryption step, any votes that have undergone the vote packing step
will need to be decoded. Those votes that were not packed will decrypt to the correct
candidate identifier; however, the packed votes will decrypt to the combined value of the
packed votes. In this case, to get the plaintext vote, the combined value must be looked
up in the Vote Packing table, which will provide the appropriate decoding. Additionally,
if a race identifier has been applied, a number of lookups will need to be performed to
identify both the race the vote is for and the decoded vote. It is worth remembering
that the output from the Mixnet is just the decrypted vote: there is no serial number,
so we need to identify (by searching) the appropriate race the vote should be applied to.
Vote Packing—No Race Identifier
Where no race identifier has been applied, the decrypted value should be looked up in
the previously constructed vote packing table. Race identifiers will be applied across all
inputs to a particular mix, but they may not be applied to all mixes. The vote packing
table will be a sorted table, so the lookup is a simple binary search. This will need to
be performed for each decrypted ciphertext, and so should be optimised for maximum
e ciency. There are a number of techniques for optimising the lookup—for example,
fixed length values and cached mapped lookups. An optimisation could be obtained
by taking further consideration of the structure of the overall table. The vote packing
table should exhibit a uniform distribution of values, since the output of any individual
value will be pseudorandom. Hence, it should be possible to predict a smaller section of
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the table where the lookup will start. At an abstract level, the overall table will have
approximately equal numbers of values starting with a ‘1’, as it does starting with a ‘2’,
and a ‘3’, etc. Thus, if the value to be looked up starts with a ‘1’, it is possible to narrow
the search to a little over 10% of the entire table. By also looking at the next digit it
will be possible to narrow it further. There is a trade o↵ between time taken to predict
the location and the time saved doing a bigger binary search. However, if the starting
size of the table being searched can initially be reduced, it will help the performance of
the underlying disk cache.
Vote Packing—With Race Identifier
Where a race identifier has been applied during the vote packing stage, the only way to
recover the race identifier is to try multiplying the decrypted value by the inverse of each
pre-committed race identifier ri 1 mod p, and then performing a search on the table. If
no value is found within the table, the next race identifier is tried, and so on until a
match is found. On finding a match, the relevant race identifier is known as well as the
contents of the first ciphertext. From that point on, the race identifier can be used to
process any other ciphertexts in the same row, since all ciphertexts in that row will be
from the same race.
4.5.7. Upload data to the WBB
Once the Mixnet has successfully finished both mixing and decrypting, the relevant
proofs and plaintext votes must be committed to the WBB. The WBB will provide a
web-based interface for the Mixnet manager to communicate with for uploading the data.
The exact contents and files to be uploaded will be specified in the Mixnet configuration
document. The proofs are likely to be constructed as a folder containing a number of
files, while the plaintext votes will consist of a single file for each mix that has been
performed.
4.6. Key Management
A number of di↵erent signing and encryption keys will need to be generated by various
di↵erent components. The keys for the central services—WBB, Print on Demand and
Mix Servers—will be generated as part of those components. However, the signing keys
for each EBM and Print on Demand Client will need to be generated on the devices
themselves. Each Print on Demand Client will also need to generate a encryption key
pair for use in the Print on Demand protocol. The standard way for verifying the validity
of public keys is to produce an X.509 certificate to accompany the public key. There are
commercial organisations that provide such a service; however, almost all of the keys we
produce will only be used internally, so there is no need to engage with such a service.
The one exception to this is the joint public key used by the WBB that produces publicly
verifiable signatures. This public key will need to be signed by a recognised certificate
signing authority.
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4.6.1. Certificate Signing Authority (CSA)
An internal signing authority will be created. Existing open source packages already exist
(for example, http://www.ejbca.org/) that provide all the necessary functionality. The
Key Management package should provide a simple user interface for an administrator
to authorise certificate signing requests, without requiring in-depth knowledge of the
underlying system. All actions should be appropriately logged to provide accountability.
Near real-time revocation lists should also be created to allow rapid revocation of a
certificate, should a client device (EBM/Print on Demand client) become compromised.
The underlying system may use an existing open source package or implement its own
simplified authority; however, whichever approach is selected, the implementation should
comply with appropriate PKI standards.
4.6.2. Certificate Signing Requests
The client devices and servers will produce standards-compliant Certificate Signing Re-
quests. The CSA should provide a web-based interface for the submission of these
requests. The requests should be displayed to alert an administrator that they need
authorising. There is no automatic authorisation of a request. Once a request has been
completed it should be included in the directory of certificates provided by the CSA. The
client device will periodically poll the CSA, while waiting for a response to the signing
request, until it has received either a positive or negative response. It is not anticipated
that certificate signing requests will be submitted during the run of the election. This
would only occur in the situation where a new device or re-initialised device has been
added to the network, and in such a case, particular caution would need to be taken.
The CSA signing key should be held o✏ine during the election.
4.7. Web Bulletin Board (WBB)
The WBB will consist of two services; a public facing website (Public WBB) and an
internal facing WBB (referred to as Peered WBB or just WBB). At an abstract level,
this consists of two components. The internal component receives submissions in real
time and provides appropriate signatures and authorisations. At the end of each day
the internal-facing component commits to its contents and sends the contents and com-
mitment to the public facing component. A voter must therefore wait till the end of the
day before checking the WBB for their submission. The advantage of such an approach
is that it makes serving the content easier and allows the voter to be certain that the
contents will not change over time; in addition, it means that there is only a single view
of the WBB at any one time. This is because the commitment is publicly broadcast.
The design aims to remove any single points of failure, and therefore avoids having
a single machine responsible for the real-time, internal-facing component. The public-
facing component can easily be mirrored since it does no processing and is just a conduit.
In making the internal component robust, we have to manage the added complexity of
having multiple peers, and be able to handle the possibility that some of the peers may
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be acting dishonestly. The design is intended to work in a distributed manner, such that
the individual peers could be run by di↵erent stakeholders. However, initially, all peers
will be managed by the VEC.
The following functionality must be provided by the WBB:
• Receive votes and provide a signature guaranteeing that the data has been correctly
stored
• Receive protocol data (proofs, ciphertexts, serial numbers, etc.) and provide a
guarantee that they have been correctly stored
• Authorise audit requests for unused ballots and refuse requests for used ballots
• Allocate serial numbers for ballots
• Store all election data (proofs, ciphertexts, submissions)
• Commit all new data to the Public WBB at the end of each day
4.7.1. General Properties
These are the generalised properties:
1. The signature scheme threshold is 23
2. The protocol can handle any number fewer than 13 parties being dishonest (includ-
ing the EBM as a party)
4.7.2. Prerequisites
The following are the prerequisites on the threshold keys:
1. Each peer i has two key pairs (SK1,i and SK2,i). The SK1 and SK2 (secret keys)
are threshold signature private keys. Each has a corresponding publicly known
public key PK1 and PK2.
2. The voter should be able to access PK2 on a smartphone, and can check data
signed with SK2.
4.7.3. Vote Submission Protocol
1. Voter presses submit button on EBM
2. EBM signs vote data and simultaneously sends to all peers
3. On receipt of a submission the peers (concurrently) perform the following:
a) Peer logs receipt of a communication
b) Peer checks the serial number has not been used for auditing or previously
submitted as a vote
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• If serial number has already been used, peer creates a signature share of
relevant error message and returns it to the EBM. Protocol ends without
anything being written to the database
c) Peer stores data in its database
d) Peer signs vote with its share SK1,i and sends it to all other peers
e) When a peer receives a signature share, it does the following:
i. If it does not currently hold a share from that peer it stores it, otherwise
it ignores it
ii. Check if it has a threshold set of valid shares—a share is valid if it is a
signature of the same data as the peer has signed
iii. Once a valid signature has been combined it is stored in the peer’s
database
iv. Peer signs vote with SK2 and returns it directly to the EBM
4. EBM waits until it receives a threshold set of signature shares or times out
5. Threshold set of shares could be a signature of the vote or an error signature
6. Signature is printed on receipt
7. Voter verifies signature and leaves polling station if valid, and cancels vote if invalid
or no signature was returned
4.7.4. Notation
Some notation that will be used throughout the diagrams to aid brevity:
• The signed serial number: SignPODS{SerialNo} : SignedSerial
• The preferences pPrefs are the voters preferences or choice in the races on the
ballot
• A vote v consists of pPrefs, SerialNo, SignedSerial
• EBM Signature EBMSig is of this data SignEBM{pPrefs, SerialNo, SignedSerial}
• The submission from the EBM is: SerialNo, SignedSerial, v, EBMSig,EBMID,
where RBMID is the unique identification of the respective EBM
4.7.5. Receiving Votes
Figure 4.6 shows the communication between the EBM and three peers. We show only
three peers for brevity, but the system must be capable of working with an arbitrary
number of peers that will be configured prior to the start of the election.
Figure 4.7 provides a flow chart of the operation of the EBM and the actions it
performs. Where timeouts are referred to, these should be configurable parameters, and
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Figure 4.6.: EBM to WBB
must not be hard-coded into the system. The timeouts will be adjusted according to the
real-world setup. For example, if network communication is over a mobile connection,
the timeout will be extended. Where a timeout exists on the Server and on the EBM,
the timeout on the server should be shorter than that on the EBM. The flow chart in
Figure 4.7 is linked to the flow chart in Figure 4.10 and illustrates what is occurring on
the back-end.
Figure 4.8 illustrates the communication between the peers within the WBB service.
This is further detailed in the flow chart in Figure 4.10. As above, this is illustrated with
just three peers, but should be able to handle an arbitrary number of peers. Ideally,
peers should be run in a multi-threaded environment to ensure the greatest throughput
possible—the aim is to get as close to real-time as we can achieve. However, for security
reasons, it is vital that there are not two concurrent instances of the protocol running on
the same serial number, and so peers should carefully manage the threading of operations.
When a request is received, it should be checked, in a synchronised manner, that an
existing run of the protocol is not currently in operation for that serial number. If such
an instance is already running, the request must be queued until the existing run finishes.
If the serial number is di↵erent, the peer is free to run the protocol concurrently in a
new thread.
The same process is followed if the contents of the message is di↵erent—for example,
if a cancellation request or audit request is being sent. The exact contents and under-
lying actions will be di↵erent, as will be explained further on. However, the underlying
communication structure is the same.
42
Start
Prepare and sign 
vote data
Send vote to all 
WBB Peers Sleep for 1 second
Have I received a 
valid signature
End
yes
Have I 
exceeded the 
timeout
no
no
Print error on 
receipt
yes
Is Signature 
valid
Print Sig Error 
Report
no
Print signature on 
receipt yes
End
Is it a valid 
error signature
No
Print Relevant 
Error Message 
and Signature
yes
End End
A valid error signature would 
be generated when a 
threshold of peers determine 
an error has taken place. For 
example, the serial number 
has already been used.
End
Figure 4.7.: EBM to WBB
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4.7.6. End-of-Day Commit
The end-of-day commit procedure transfers the joint collection of valid data to the
public-facing WBB. The specific data to be provided to the Public WBB is yet to
be decided: for transparency it should include the complete collection of transactions
that have been processed by the peered WBB (votes, cancellations, and audits), and
should enable voters to conveniently check that their votes have been included. The
Database Commitment below supplies the complete collection of transactions to the
Public WBB. The Hash Tree Commitment below provides a data structure that enables
e cient checking of votes. The appropriate approach is still to be decided.
The end-of-day commit should be performed nightly when the service is under mini-
mum load. Note, there is a chance that the service will never be under zero load, owing
to the requirement to provide a service at foreign embassies in di↵erent time zones across
the world. The process is fully detailed in the flow chart in Figure 4.11.
The following is a summary of the protocol to transfer the database of transactions
to the Public WBB:
Database Commitment
1. Each peer creates a hash of its database, signs it (using an individual, not threshold,
signing key) and distributes the hash to all other peers
2. On receipt of a signed hash of another peer’s database the peer stores it
3. Once a peer has received a signed hash from all other peers, or a timeout has
occurred and it has received at least the threshold number of hashes, it compares
all of the hashes
4. If all the hashes match, it means all databases are the same
a) Each peer will now create a signature of its hash using the joint signing key
SK2 and distribute it to all other peers
b) Once a threshold set of signatures is obtained the peer will contact the public
WBB and o↵er to provide the database and associated signature
5. If some of the hashes do not match the following takes place
a) Each peer sends its database to all other peers
b) On receipt of a database from another peer the receiving peer will check for
any valid votes/cancellations/audits that are not present in its own database
and add them to it
c) Once a peer has received a database from all other peers, or a timeout has
been reached, it will hash the new database and sign it under the joint SK2
and send that signature to all other peers
d) Once a threshold set of signatures is obtained the peer will contact the public
WBB and o↵er to provide the database and associated signature
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A hash tree provides a possible data structure to allow voters to check their votes. A
hash tree can be constructed from the database of votes, and transferred to the Public
WBB with the following protocol:
Hash Tree Commitment
Hash Tree Construction Each Peer i computes from its database Di the appropriate
state for all serial numbers for which it has an entry—whether it is associated
with a vote, a cancellation, or an audit—and constructs a hash tree HTi of this
information. Call the root hash Hi.
Optimistic Commit Step This consist of two rounds:
• Round 1: Each Peer i signs Hi with si1 and sends it to all other peers.
[Peer i to all peers:] commitmsg1 = Hi, sigsi1(Hi)
• Round 2: If Peer i received correctly signed hashes from all other peers,
or a timeout has occurred and it has received at least a threshold number of
correctly signed hashes, and all of the received hashes are equal to Hi, then
it signs Hi with SKi2 and sends it together with its entire hash tree HTi to
the public WBB.
[Peer i to public WBB:] commitmsg2 = HTi, sigSKi2Hi
Protocol ends (success).
• Otherwise, go to the Fallback Commit Protocol. (This might be due to time-
out or to getting di↵erent hashes.)
Fallback Commit Protocol (One extra round) This has another two rounds. If we
know there has been an error, we can skip the optimistic commit step and do
this first.
• Round 1: Each Peer i sends Di to all other peers.
[Peer i to all peers:] commitmsg3 = Di
• Round 2: Having received Dj , Peer i updates Di as follows: For all valid
SerialNos s, if Dj contains an update request v on s and Peer j has also sent
t1 valid distinct SK
j
1 signatures on v, add v to Di.
Then recompute HTi and redo the optimistic commit step.
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Figure 4.11.: WBB Commitment Flow Chart
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4.7.7. Cancellations
Cancellations are a key component of the protocol and are essential for its security. A
cancellation will be issued by an administrator device. This could be centrally managed,
or run in the poll station (to be decided). Fundamentally, the process is similar to vote
casting, although the exact contents of the cancellation request are slightly di↵erent. It
should be noted that there will be manual procedures and a paper audit trail completed
in order to e↵ect a cancellation; however, the operation of such a process is outside the
scope of this document. The cancellation procedure is as follows:
1. Administrator sends a signed cancellation request consisting of:
SignAdmin{Cancel, SerialNo, SignPODS{SerialNo}} to all peers
2. On receipt of a cancellation request the peer logs the request and stores it in its
database. It signs the request using SK1 and distributes the signature share to all
other peers
3. On receipt of a signature from another peer the peer will store it in its database
4. Once a threshold of valid signatures is received the peer will sign the cancellation
request under SK2 and return it to the administrator machine
5. Once the administrator machine receives a threshold of valid shares it provides a
cancellation receipt, including the signature, for both the administrator and the
voter
6. If the process times out or a signature is not constructed the protocol is re-run
until it is successful
The re-running of the protocol needs to be carefully managed. The same restrictions
on concurrent runs of the protocol on the same serial number should still be enforced.
Additionally, the fundamental requirement of the WBB is that nothing should ever be
deleted or overwritten. In consequence, there could be multiple runs of the cancellation
procedure. All the runs should be stored in relation to that serial number, until a
successful cancellation has taken place. A successful cancellation is reached when a peer
has a threshold set of signatures under SK1. After this, the peer can reject a further
cancellation request on the grounds that the cancellation has already taken place, but
it should also return a copy of the cancellation signature to the administrator.
4.7.8. Audit
The audit process will be performed by the Print on Demand Service, once the Print
on Demand Service has first obtained an authorisation from the WBB to undertake the
audit procedure. The audit is very similar to a vote, except it does not contain any
vote data, and is prefixed with the word “Audit”. The WBB will authorise an audit
only if the ballot has not already been used for voting and has not been cancelled. The
same process as a voting request is undertaken by the Audit Machine in the poll station.
49
It will contact the WBB and request an audit. The audit request can be performed
multiple times if it fails; however, once a peer has received any form of audit request,
whether successful or not, it will not permit that ballot to be used for voting. Each audit
request should be recorded in the same way as a cancellation. Once a successful audit
request has been processed and signed under SK1, the peer can reject the request, but
should also return the valid audit request signature.
4.7.9. Submission of Bulk Data
In addition to voting data, there are points within the system where data should be
submitted for commitment to the WBB. For example, each mix server will need to
publish the proofs of shu✏ing and key transformation following the ballot generation
protocol. This is a slightly more complicated process, since there is no implicit identi-
fication for the request, unlike the serial number used in other such requests. However,
the data submission is similar in nature to the submission of vote data, and should
proceed in a similar manner. An unsuccessful request should be cancelled and a new
request submitted. It is the role of the submitter to append a randomly generated
requestID to identify a submission. The requestID should be signed by the submit-
ter and the WBB should check that the signature is valid before accepting a request.
The WBB must log the requestID along with the submitted data and should reject
any attempt to resubmit a previously used requestID. The contents of the data being
submitted is somewhat arbitrary. The message will therefore be of the following form:
submitter, requestID, Signsubmitter{requestID}, data. Additionally, a signature of the
complete request under the key of the submitter will also be appended. The data could
be a file or raw data; how that is stored is left up to the WBB. The same procedure as the
vote submission is then followed. If the submitter receives a valid signature under SK2,
they can be assured that a threshold set of parties have successfully stored their data. If
the process fails, the submitter must request a cancellation of that data in a similar way
to the vote cancellation procedure. However, in this scenario, only the submitter can
request a cancellation of its own submission. Once the submission has been cancelled
a new request with a new requestID is constructed and the protocol is run again. It
should be noted that we do not expect these requests to fail; however, we must ensure
suitable procedures are in place in case they do.
4.8. Public WBB
The Public WBB is a simple service that stores data and accepts updates from the Peered
WBB. It should be implemented in such a way that it can be easily mirrored to allow
both widespread distribution of the data and provision of robust access. It is likely that
the Public WBB will be a cloud-based service that can be easily scaled to user/voter
demand. The key operation is to serve the data it has from previous commitments.
Essentially, this task involves simply serving the raw data and signatures; however, it
is important to serve it in a user-friendly manner. For example, if a vote has been
cancelled following a successful submission, the original submission will still be included
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in the commitment, but it will now have a corresponding cancellation record; when a
request for a serial number is received, all the relevant data should be displayed. The
system should also provide easy access to download the complete set of data for both
the entire election and for the daily commitment containing a particular ballot. This is
to enable easy verification of the data by other organisations and voters.
4.8.1. Nightly Updates
The process for nightly commitments is detailed in Section 4.7.6. It was mentioned that
once a peer has a successful signature on a submission, it will contact the Public WBB to
notify it of the available update. On receipt of such a notification, the Public WBB will
request the update from the relevant peer, which will send the complete database along
with the necessary signatures. The Public WBB will receive multiple notifications of an
available update, because each peer that has successfully taken part in the protocol will
send such a notification. It is up to the Public WBB to select which peer to download
the data from. Once it has downloaded the data, it should check that the contents of
the database and the signature are valid. If the signature does not validate, the Public
WBB should discard the data and request it from a di↵erent peer.
4.8.2. Mirroring
The Public WBB, as discussed above, should be set up to be easily scalable and mirrored.
All updates from the Peered WBB will be sent through the Public WBB, so anyone
wishing to set up a mirror of the Public WBB should be able to request notification of
any updates received by the Public WBB from the Peered WBB; the Public WBB should
provide such notifications so that the mirror service can download the relevant update
from the Public WBB. There should be no external access to the Peered (internal-facing)
WBB.
4.9. Testing, Error Management and Notification
There is an overarching requirement that almost everything should be logged, both in
terms of outgoing and incoming communication and in operations being undertaken by
processes. Clearly, there are certain pieces of data that should not be appearing in logs,
and should never be stored to the hard disk, primarily the randomness values used in
both signatures and encryptions/re-encryptions.
A significant portion of the protocols are in place to handle situations when something
goes wrong or communication is lost. The process must always have a way of moving
forward, and should never get into a state that prevents the election continuing or the
result being obtained (subject to certain assumptions on the number of failures handled).
Although failures are unlikely, it is essential they are handled and logged, and a suitable
notification made.
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4.9.1. Testing
At the heart of preparedness for failures is testing. The protocols have been designed
to handle a certain number of failures. Such scenarios should be tested against, and
detailed results provided. It is also necessary to test what happens when we break the
assumptions on the number of failures. Procedures need to be prepared to handle a
variety of situations, and such testing will feed into the preparation of those procedures.
Unit testing is an important component of software development, but on its own is not
su cient to provide the level of assurance required of the system detailed in this design.
The testing procedure will be a joint process between the front-end development and
the back-end development. However, automated stress testing and failure testing of the
back end should be prepared and run whenever changes have been made.
4.9.2. Error Management and Notification
The design has to be prepared for errors and failures. Failure scenarios should be logged
and a suitable notification system should be put in place to provide election authorities
with a global view of the system. The severity of the failure should be clear, and di↵erent
viewpoints provided. For example, if a WBB peer stops responding, it is a serious issue
and must be flagged accordingly. A failed connection between and EBM and a peer is
not as serious; however, it should be logged. A view of the aggregated errors should
also be provided, to give administrators an idea, and early warning, of any problems
arising. For example, if there are many failed connections coming from a particular
polling station, or several cancellation requests related to a particular EBM, this should
be flagged to administrators for further investigation. This will require a threshold
associated with di↵erent errors to determine when the issue is escalated and highlighted
to the administrator. These thresholds should be configurable both before and during
runtime to handle the dynamic nature of the system.
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A. Mixnet Specification
A.1. Mixnet Specification
The background literature on Mixnets relevant for the purposes of this document, cov-
ering mixes, re-encryption mixes, and proofs of shu✏es, is [Cha81, SK95, FS01, Nef01,
Wik09], [TW10]. An example Mixnet is described in [Wik12].
The exact Mixnet that will be used by the vVote system has not been finalised at
the time of writing, and so there is a level of flexibility required for interfacing to the
Mixnet. The following section will provide a high level overview of the functionality that
the Mixnet component will o↵er.
A.1.1. Functions
The Mixnet is at the core of the system and will perform a number of functions:
• Distributed key generation of a threshold cryptography key pair
• Mixing of rows of ciphertexts; able to handle both single and multi-column struc-
tures
• Threshold decryption in a column-wise manner
• Production of proofs of mixing and decryption in a format and style that will allow
independent verifiers to be written
The Mixnet will provide interfaces for the submission of ciphertexts for mixing, as well
as the production of files of the output plaintexts and the relevant proofs. The structure
of the proofs directories and files will be fully documented to allow the implementation
of third-party, independent, verifiers (see, for example, [Wik11]). The individual mix
servers will be operated by di↵erent organisations (Electoral Commissions) and so the
implementation must work over both an internal and an external network. The setup
phases and safe shutdown phases will also be implemented and provided. The various
operations will be called from the command line; however, the Mixnet Manager specified
within this document should provide a simple front-end interface to the command line
operations.
A.1.2. Interfaces
Because the Mixnet has not been finalised, it is not possible to state the exact file
formats or interfaces that will be provided. However, such interfaces and formats will be
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specified prior to the commencement of implementation of the system specified within
this document. The file formats will be generic formats that are commonplace when
handling data. For example, communication over the web will almost certainly use
a JSON structure, while file formats for local operations are likely to use a Comma
Separated structure or similar.
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